This past Saturday marked the much-anticipated official Premier League debut of Arne Slot. Liverpool visited newly promoted Ipswich Town. After a challenging first half, Slot made some tactical adjustments during halftime, leading to a 0-2 victory following a strong second half. In this blog, we will delve into the team tactical ‘tweaks’ Slot implemented and their impact on individual tactical execution.
As mentioned, the first half was a struggle. Liverpool found it difficult to break free from Ipswich’s intense high press. Ipswich defended the central areas with four players, combining this with aggressive pressure, spurred on by their enthusiastic home crowd (see image below).
This forced Liverpool to play through the flanks or resort to long balls, rather than the short, central combinations Arne Slot prefers. The result was a very low ‘expected goal’ total of 0.11 for the entire first half.
So, the key question is: What did Slot change tactically during halftime to enable Liverpool to play through Ipswich’s high press? The answer lies in two parts. Firstly, the midfielders began dropping deeper, positioning themselves outside the opponent’s block. As shown in the video below, Dominik Szoboszlai, as a midfielder, almost stands on the sideline to keep the field wide.
Secondly, during the buildup, the center-backs (Van Dijk and Konaté in the second half) adopted a wider position when Liverpool was under pressure. The result of these two tactical adjustments was that Ipswich’s players had to cover greater distances when defending. This, in turn, gave Liverpool’s defenders more space during the buildup to find midfielders and forwards with passes.
In this article, we focus on the second tactical shift, examining the Game Action: Outside positioning of the center-backs during the buildup. The goal of this Game Action is to create optimal conditions to advance towards the opponent’s goal, either with a pass or a dribble. Key aspects of execution include positioning, distance (from opponents), body orientation, scanning, and focus (are you truly focused on playing forward?).
As mentioned earlier, Konaté and Van Dijk adopted a wider position during the second half. The clip below (the 1-0) is a great example. Trent Alexander-Arnold, Virgil van Dijk, and Ibrahima Konaté spread the field, increasing the space Ipswich’s defenders had to cover. This concludes the team tactical portion. On an individual tactical level, Konaté positioned himself between two Ipswich players, allowing him to pass through the lines to Ryan Gravenberch (a zero-point). He maintained enough distance from his direct opponent to receive the ball, look up, and pass it on. Additionally, his body was open when receiving the ball, and his focus was immediately on the central area. These individual actions enabled him to bypass three opponents with his pass, leading to the 1-0.
In the first half, Van Dijk was constantly under pressure and struggled to find midfielders or forwards with ground passes, as Slot prefers. Van Dijk was forced to opt for long balls. See the video below.
In the second half, however, this changed. A great example is the 2-0. When Virgil van Dijk receives the ball back from the midfielder, Trent Alexander-Arnold is stretching the field. Left-winger Luis Diaz is also keeping the field wide, forcing Ipswich’s players to cover larger distances. Mohammed Salah recognizes this and makes a deep run. Virgil van Dijk notices this run due to his forward focus and his first touch being aimed forward as well. His signature cross-field pass follows, and Salah combines with Szoboszlai to make it 0-2.
The following clip shows a great example of Slot’s ideal scenario: a short pass from Van Dijk to a midfielder between the lines. This pass is possible because Van Dijk drops back a few meters with an open body stance and has already scanned the space towards the midfield before receiving the ball.
In the situation below, Van Dijk also successfully achieves his goal when positioning outside the block, by playing the ball directly to Mac Allister between the lines. However, the execution is not optimal. When Alisson plays the ball, Van Dijk’s body is closed, and he has not yet scanned the most valuable space (the central area). Additionally, the distance to his opponent is too small, causing him to come under immediate pressure when receiving the ball. He compensates for this with excellent focus, taking the ball with his left foot and playing it on immediately.
Yet, even in the second half, positioning outside the block does not always achieve the intended goal (advancing towards the opponent’s goal). As shown in the clip below.
Before Van Dijk receives the ball from left-back Robertson, he scans the central area twice and positions his body relatively open. However, the distance to his direct opponent is (too) small, causing him to come under immediate pressure, blocking the passing lane to Gravenberch. This forces him to switch the ball to the other side. When he receives the ball back from the goalkeeper a few seconds later, the distance to his direct opponent is again small, and Van Dijk’s body is closed. Additionally, his position is not optimal, as his direct opponent can press from a straight line out of the central area (frontal pressure), blocking the passing lane towards the center. As a result, Van Dijk is forced to play the ball back to the keeper.
This shows that individual tactics and their execution are always crucial, regardless of the team tactics and their effectiveness. Liverpool’s second half against Ipswich demonstrates that a combination of effective team tactics with the right individual tactical decisions and proper execution can have a very positive impact on the match outcome. In the second half, Liverpool recorded 2.61 expected goals. Slot’s conclusion was: ‘This was a game of two halves.’
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